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The recent withdrawal of Cox-2 Inhibitors has generated debate on the role of information in drug
diffusion: can the market learn the efficacy of new drugs, or does it depend solely on manufacturer
advertising and FDA updates? In this study, we use a novel data set to study the diffusion of three
Cox-2 Inhibitors – Celebrex, Vioxx and Bextra – before the Vioxx withdrawal. Our study has two
unique features: first, we observe each patient's reported satisfaction after consuming a drug. This
patient level data set, together with market level data on FDA updates, media coverage, academic
articles, and pharmaceutical advertising, allows us to model individual prescription decisions. Second,
we distinguish across-patient learning of a drug's general efficacy from the within-patient learning
of the match between a drug and a patient. Our results suggest that prescription choice is sensitive
to many sources of information. At the beginning of 2001 and upon Bextra entry in January 2002,
doctors held a strong prior belief about the efficacy of Celebrex, Vioxx, and Bextra. As a result, the
learning from patient satisfaction is gradual and more concentrated on drug-patient match than on
across-patient spillovers. News articles are weakly beneficial for Cox-2 drug sales, but academic articles
appear to be detrimental. The impact of FDA updates is close to zero once we control for academic
articles, which suggests that FDA updates follow academic articles and therefore deliver little new
information to doctors. We find that drug advertising also influences the choice of a patient's medication.
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Information plays a critical role in evaluating a prescription drug: before a drug goes on a market,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires clinical trials, which are often conducted on
a limited number of human volunteers, in comparison with a placebo, and during a period that
is appropriate to determine the drug’s short-run eﬃcacy and safety. After the FDA approval,
more information is available from long-term clinical trials and actual everyday usage. The
post-marketing information, especially those from clinical trials, may lead to new indications,
new warnings, or a complete withdrawal.
The withdrawal of Vioxx (and other blockbuster drugs) triggered intensive scrutiny about
post-marketing surveillance. Unlike before-marketing clinical trials, post-approval evaluation
isn’t required for every drug and there is “a lack of criteria for determining what safety actions to
take and when to take them” (GAO 2006). According to the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development (TCSDD 2004), although 73% of new drugs approved in 1998-2003 involved post-
marketing trials, only one-third were mandated and the trial completion rate was as low as 24%
(many voluntary trials are conducted by manufacturers in hope of new drug indications). The
oﬃcial post-approval surveillance system, the FDA MedWatch, depends on voluntary reporting
as well (from healthcare professionals and consumers).1
Experts are concerned that, in this setting, neither drug manufacturers nor the FDA is
well positioned to monitor drug safety: drug sales introduce an obvious conﬂict of interest for
manufacturers, and it is diﬃcult to expect the FDA to seek post-marketing evidence to prove
that its initial approval was wrong (Fontanarosa 2004).2 These criticisms have led to multiple
proposals for FDA reform (GAO 2006, Ray and Stein 2006, Grassley 2005, NCL 2005, US PIRG
2006), an overall evaluation of the FDA (IOM 2007), and ﬁnally a new legislation that grants
the FDA more power and resources to overhaul post-marketing surveillance.3
Many of the proposed reforms, for example utilizing databases from health organizations,
regulating post-marketing clinical trials, convening professional ﬁndings, making an active use
of the FDA MedWatch, and communicating emerging information in a timely manner, depend
1The system is designed to detect suspected, rare adverse events. Source: www.fda.gov/medwatch/What.htm.
See Slater (2005) for a more comprehensive description of the FDA system.
2See Medscape news “Reform of Postmarketing Drug Surveillance System Needed, Experts Say” Nov. 30,
2004 and USA Today news “Report questions FDA’s safety procedures” April 23, 2006 for a brief summary on
the debate about FDA post-approval surveillance.
3Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (HR3580).
1on how doctors process available information and how they employ such information in their
prescriptions. At one extreme, if every doctor strictly follows the FDA guidelines and ignores the
information generated from daily practice, we must ensure that the FDA gathers all the relevant
information and processes it in a timely manner. At the other extreme, doctors may have
learned from the experience of their own patients, made inferences from drug advertising, talked
to other doctors, read newspapers, and followed all the updates from the medical literature. If
so, regulatory resources are better used for facilitating information ﬂow throughout the market
and alerting emerging information that is unavailable from other channels.
Using Cox-2 Inhibitors as an example, this paper provides a detailed empirical account of
how the market learns about young drugs after approval but before withdrawal. The information
issues arising from Cox-2 Inhibitors are dramatic and unusual, but the lessons learned from this
class are potentially relevant for every drug that has been or is to be approved by the FDA.
Between 1998 and 2001, the FDA approved three Cyclooxygenase-2 (Cox-2) Inhibitors:
Celebrex (Dec. 1998), Vioxx (May. 1999), and Bextra (Nov. 2001). All of them were heavily
advertised as safer alternatives to then existing pain killers. By September 2004, the class had
more than 10 million patients, annual sales had reached $6 billion in 2003, and total advertising
dollars spent in 2003 were as high as $400 million. After a clinical trial associated Vioxx with
severe cardiovascular (CV) risks, Merck withdrew the blockbuster drug in September 2004. CV
risks and enhanced concerns on skin irritation led to the withdrawal of Bextra in April 2005. As
of today, Celebrex is the only Cox-2 Inhibitor remaining on the market, with warnings added in
April 2005.
Because the Vioxx withdrawal is likely to raise concerns about the other Cox-2 inhibitors4,
we believe the role of information has changed dramatically before and after the Vioxx with-
drawal. To better characterize the diﬀusion of new drugs, this paper focuses on the prescription
decisions made before the end of 2003. The nine-month lag between the end of 2003 and the
Vioxx withdrawal should be long enough to avoid any contamination from the withdrawal deci-
sion.
More speciﬁcally, we study how physicians learn about overall drug quality (across-patient
learning) as well as how well each drug in the category matches the needs of a speciﬁc patient
(within-patient learning). For this purpose, we use a unique data set obtained from a marketing
4The ﬁrst oﬃcial claim of CV risks being a class eﬀect is documented by FDA in April 2005. When we focus
on the period of 2001-2003, we count a medline article as applicable to all the Cox-2 inhibitors available on the
market if the article does not specify drug brand in the abstract.
2research company, IPSOS. IPSOS tracked a national representative sample of patients from 1999
to 2005. Not only did IPSOS report every NSAIDS (nonsteroidal anti-inﬂammatory drugs) pre-
scription received by the sampled patients (including traditional NSAIDS and Cox-2s), it started
to keep a longitudinal record of patient satisfaction with these prescriptions from January 2001.
These satisfaction measures, together with FDA udpates, media coverage, academic articles, and
manufacturer advertising, allow us to associate individual prescriptions with various sources of
information.
Note that information content may diﬀer across sources: for example, heart attack is rare
and often urgent when it occurs. Patients that suﬀered from such an adverse event may not
have time and opportunity to report this in the next doctor’s visit. However, these events may
be reviewed in an article published later on in the mass media or in academic journals. The
accumulation of such events may also lead to some FDA actions. In comparison, minor side
eﬀects such as stomach upset and skin rash are noticeable to individual patients and are more
likely incorporated in their satisfaction report. These potential diﬀerences motivate us to treat
each information source diﬀerently.
Our study is diﬀerent from the existing literature in three ways: ﬁrst, existing studies
have focused on either learning across patients (Ching 2005, Coselli and Shum 2004, Narayanan
et al. 2005) or learning within patients (Crawford and Shum 2005) but not both. We believe
that these two types of learning are linked: doctors are not only uncertain about the average
quality of a drug, they also have imperfect information on the speciﬁc match between a drug and
a patient. Both uncertainties are embodied in one single report of patient satisfaction, hence
ignoring any one of them is likely to introduce estimation bias. As shown in our model, we
assume the average drug quality is learned from the experiences of all patients (within a census
division) while the patient-drug match is learned from a speciﬁc patient’s own experience.
Second, our data are better-suited to modeling the across- and within-patient learning
because we observe patients’ satisfaction signals. Equipped with the patient satisﬁcation data,
we assume doctors held a prior belief about Cox-2 inhibitors at the end of 2000, which summa-
rizes all the information up to 2000. Starting Jan. 2001, doctors received patient satisfaction
information on a daily basis and used them to form posterior beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. To
our knowledge, all the existing studies on drug learning have no direct data on patient feedback
signals. Instead, authors assume that the unobserved signals conform to a given statistical distri-
bution. They then model prescription choice as a result of random draws from that distribution.
Since we observe the realization of feedback signals, we can (a) impose fewer identiﬁcation re-
3strictions, (b) eliminate the computational burden of using simulation to approximate the real
signals; and (c) make the model more parsimonious by eliminating the need to estimate the true
drug qualities.
Despite the beneﬁts associated with our data, they are still imperfect for integrating the
two types of learning because we do not observe physician identities. Thus, we need to make
assumptions on the mechanism by which information is shared across patients. In particular,
we assume that doctors in the same geographic area (in our case, census division) exchange
opinions and learn from each others’ patients experiences. To mitigate the eﬀect of arbitrary
assumptions regarding the geographic area of information exchange, we investigate the scope of
information pooling by changing the deﬁnition of geographic area and assessing model ﬁt.
Our third contribution lies in collecting factors other than patient satisfaction that could
potentially inﬂuence a doctor’s prescription decision. Speciﬁcally, we allow FDA updates, manu-
facturer advertising5, news reports and academic articles to enter the utility function directly and
therefore inﬂuence doctors’ relative preference across drugs.6 These data allow us to distinguish
the impact of patient satisfaction from other factors.
Our results suggest that prescription choice is sensitive to many factors. At the beginning
of 2001 and upon the Bextra entry in January 2002, doctors held a strong prior belief about the
eﬃcacy of Celebrex, Vioxx, and Bextra. As a result, the learning from patient satisfaction is
gradual and more concentrated on drug-patient match than on across-patient spillovers. We also
ﬁnd that advertising is beneﬁcial for drug sales, so are news articles. But academic articles appear
to be detrimental. The impact of FDA updates is close to zero once we control for academic
articles, which suggests that FDA updates follow academic articles and therefore deliver little
news to doctors.
Consistent with the estimation results, our counterfactual predictions suggest that sup-
pressing FDA updates has no impact on market shares. Setting up a nationwide database of
patient feedback encourages doctors to switch from traditional NSAIDS to Cox-2s, but increas-
ing academic publications about Cox-2s steers market share away from Cox-2s. This suggests
that patient feedback and academic articles may reﬂect diﬀerent dimensions of drug quality, and
hence do not substitute for each other.
5Which includes detailing, direct-to-consumer advertising, and journal advertising.
6These factors are too lumpy (i.e., only observed at the aggregate market level) relative to the patient level
prescription data to accurately identify learning from these sources in a Bayesian updating framework. For more
details please see Section 4.
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides detailed information on
the background of Cox-2 Inhibitors. Section 3 describes and summarizes the data. Section 4
presents the econometric model. In Section 5, we report empirical estimates, discuss robustness
checks, and perform counterfactual predictions. Conclusions are oﬀered in Section 6.
2 Background
Cox-2 Inhibitors were initially introduced to reduce the gastrointestinal (GI) risks of conventional
non-steroidal anti-inﬂammatory drugs (NSAIDS) while maintaining the same eﬃcacy in pain
relief. Traditional NSAIDS, such as Aspirin, ibuprofen (Motrin) and naproxen (Naprosyn), block
Cox-1 and Cox-2 enzymes and therefore impede the production of the chemical messengers
(prostaglandins) that cause inﬂammation. However, since some Cox-1 enzyme exists in the
stomach and its production of chemical messengers protects the inner stomach, blocking Cox-1
enzymes tends to reduce the mucus lining of the stomach, causing GI problems such as stomach
upset, ulceration, and bleeding. In comparison, the Cox-2 enzyme is located speciﬁcally in
the areas that cause inﬂammation and not in the stomach. By selectively blocking the Cox-2
enzyme, Cox-2 inhibitors have the potential to reduce GI risks.7
Before FDA approval, clinical trials presented evidence that all three Cox-2s (Celebrex,
Vioxx and Bextra) reduce the incidence of GI ulcers visualized at endoscopy compared to certain
non-selective NSAIDS. But up to April 2005, only Vioxx demonstrated a reduced risk for serious
GI bleeding in comparison with naproxen (FDA 2005). After FDA approval, all three Cox-2s
were heavily marketed as being equally eﬀective as traditional NSAIDS but with less adverse
eﬀects on the GI system.
The diﬀusion of Cox-2 inhibitors was very fast: according to the National Ambulatory
Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) and the National Hospital Ambulatory Medicare Care Survey
(NHAMCS), in 1999 (the ﬁrst year of Cox-2 introduction), the number of ambulatory visits
resulting in Cox-2 prescriptions were 15 million, slightly more than half of the visits that resulted
in the prescriptions of traditional NSAIDs. By the end of 2000, the number of Cox-2 visits had
exceeded those for traditional NSAIDS, reaching an estimate of 31.5 million. This growth
continued in 2001, but at a much lower rate (Dai et al. 2005, Table 2).
7For a complete layperson description of Cox-2 inhibitors, readers can refer to www.medicinenet.com.
5In terms of prescriptions, according to the New Product Spectra (NPS)8, the total number
of new Cox2 prescriptions grew sharply from 61,066 in January 1999 to 2 million in December
2000, but leveled oﬀ after January 2001. The number of all Cox2 prescriptions (including new
and old) demonstrated a similar pattern. Since Bextra was not approved until November 2001,
its introduction was mainly market stealing (from Celebrex and Vioxx) rather than market
expanding.
As NPS does not track drugs beyond ﬁve years of the launch, it does not cover Celebrex
after 2003 and does not tell us the prescription trends for traditional pain-relievers. To develop
a rough understanding of these trends, we plotted the monthly count of prescriptions observed
in the individual-level IPSOS data for each Cox-2 as well as for traditional pain relievers as
a whole by aggregating over individual prescription in each month. Although the number of
individuals included in IPSOS is much smaller than those in the NPS, the diﬀusion patterns
of Cox-2s between 1999 and 2003 obtained was very similar to that obtained from the NPS
above. The aggregate IPSOS data also suggest that Cox-2s initially stole some market share
from traditional pain killers, but the whole market expanded considerably between 2000 and
2003 before returning to the 1999 level at the end of 2005. The most obvious decline started in
2004 and accelerated with the withdrawal of Vioxx and Bextra.
After a three-year placebo-controlled clinical trial9 showed that taking Vioxx 25 mg once
daily doubles the risk of serious adverse cardiovascular (CV) events, Merck withdrew Vioxx on
September 30, 2004. In April 2005, FDA’s Arthritis and Drug Safety and Risk Management
Advisory Committees reviewed the available data and concluded that (1) the increased CV
risk is a class eﬀect applying to all the Cox-2s and traditional NSAIDS; (2) Aside from the
CV risk, Bextra is associated with an increased rate of serious and potentially life-threatening
skin reactions and should be withdrawn from the market; (3) the overall beneﬁts of Celebrex
exceeded its potential risks, which allowed Celebrex to remain on the market but the label had
to be revised to carry explicit warnings on potential CV and GI risks (FDA 2005). The FDA
did not rank the three Cox-2s by their CV risks, but the evidence underlying the withdrawal
requests suggests that the overall quality of Celebrex was better than the other two, with Vioxx
being better than Bextra since only the latter was associated with skin irritations.
The adverse information about Cox-2 did not come all at once. Before the ﬁnal withdrawal
8NPS is a database provided by IMS Health that tracks monthly number of prescriptions (new and reﬁlls)
dispensed by pharmacists and monthly advertising activities of pharmaceutical manufacturers up to 60 months
after initial launch.
9The clinical trial was called the Adenomatous Polyp Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVe).
6of Vioxx and Bextra, the FDA had taken several decisions regarding the side eﬀects of each Cox-
2 brand. As shown in Table 1, FDA initiated a label change for Celebrex in June 2002 because
a long term clinical trial could not distinguish the amount of GI risk between Celebrex and
traditional NSAIDS (ibuprofen or diclofenac). This reverses the original understanding that
Celebrex is safer because of lower GI risks. In comparison, Vioxx received new warnings about
increased cardiovascular risk as early as April 2002. The ﬁrst FDA warning of skin irritations
applied to Bextra on Nov. 2002, and more Bextra warnings came in Dec. 2004 for both skin
irritations and cardiovascular risk. One task of our study is to detect whether these FDA updates
have any impact on the prescription decisions made by doctors before the Vioxx withdrawal.
3 Data Summary
This section describes our data sources, summarizes the raw data, and presents simple data
patterns that suggest across- and within-patient learning.
3.1 Data Description
We combine four data sources: (1) patient-level prescription and satisfaction data from the
IPSOS patient diary database (IPSOS-PD), (2) monthly advertising expenditures obtained from
the New Product Spectra (NPS) database, (3) the number of news articles covering Cox-2s
derived from Lexis-Nexis for the period 1999 to 2005, and (4) the number of academic articles
covering Cox-2s from Medline from 1999 to 2005.
In 1997, IPSOS created a national representative sample of 16,000 households and tracked
their drug purchasing month by month.10 The patient diary covers all the individuals within
the sampled household. Each individual, if observed in the data, is viewed as one patient. Each
record in the patient-level IPSOS data corresponds to one purchase of ethical drugs, including
prescription and over-the-counter medications. The data used in this paper include all the indi-
vidual records that IPSOS collected on traditional NSAIDS as well as on Cox-2s from January
1999 to December 2005.
Each record provides information on the patient’s prescription date, age, sex, race, house-
10Detailed description is available at http://www.ipsos.ca/product.cfm?id=66&name=Healthcare&fn=health&ﬂ=reid
and Bowman et al. (2004).
7hold income, education, copay, insurance status, and residential location deﬁned by nine Census
divisions and more than 200 DMAs (Designated Market Areas). Since over 80% of patients
have health insurance and the self-reported copays are noisy and sometimes inconsistent with
the reported drug insurance, we ignore price/copay information but include insurance status in
the empirical analysis.
Speciﬁcally, IPSOS collects information on three types of insurance variables: i) a simple
indicator of whether the patient has health insurance or not at the time of prescription (referred
to as HEALTHINS); ii) an indicator of whether the patient has an insurance plan outside of
Medicare or Medicaid (referred to as INSPLAN); and iii) an indicator of whether the patient
has any coverage for drug insurance (referred to as DRUGINS). One puzzling aspect of the data
is that the correlations among the three insurance variables are between 0.12 to 0.24, which is
not as high as expected. However, as we see later, they do seem to have some power explaining
prescription behavior. We include all three variables in the model but only as controls. Our
conversations with drug companies and insurers suggest that a majority of insurers excluded
all Cox-2s from preferred formulary tiers. If this applies to every insurer, the lack of formulary
information should not undermine our estimation results, although it may explain why drug
insurance makes a diﬀerence in the prescription choice between Cox-2s and non-Cox2s.
Starting from January 2001, the data also provide ﬁve satisfaction measures, reﬂecting
patients’ self reports on the eﬀectiveness of the prescribed drug, its side eﬀects, whether the
drug works quickly, how long it lasts, and whether it is easy to take. Each satisfaction measure
is obtained on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 denoting extremely satisﬁed and 5 denoting extremely
dissatisﬁed.
The 1999-2005 IPSOS sample involves 28,601 patients and 136,950 observations of tra-
ditional NSAIDs and Cox-2s. Since many traditional NSAIDS (say Motrin) are available over
the counter, we focus on prescriptions only. Out of the 57,942 ﬁlled prescriptions, 20.3% are
for Celebrex, 13.6% for Vioxx, 3.9% for Bextra and the rest 62.2% for traditional NSAIDS. To
ensure that this sample is indeed nationally representative, we calculate the number of COX-2
prescriptions and drug-speciﬁc market shares from the sample and compare their trends with
those reported in the NPS. They are similar. We also regress the number of new COX-2 patients
in our sample and the number of new COX-2 prescriptions in the NPS on various advertising
variables, the regression coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance are comparable. These results reassured us
about proceeding with the IPSOS data.
The sample is further reduced to 8,077 patients and 27,326 prescriptions after we (1) focus
8on the records with non-missing values in all ﬁve satisfaction questions, (2) delete observations
that have missing Census division indicators, and (3) restrict the sample to 2001-2003 when
advertising data are available from NPS. The reduction is largely due to the fact that IPSOS did
not collect satisfaction data until 2001. Between 2001 and 2003, the reporting rate for satisfaction
measures is 94.8%.11 To best ﬁt a model of how doctors learn from patient satisfaction, we focus
on new patients that ﬁrst appear in the data set on or after January 1, 2001. The main reason
for discarding old patients is because doctors may have formed patient-speciﬁc priors based on
their satisfaction before 2001, on which we have no information. Fortunately, there are not too
many of them: 6,577 out of the 8,077 patients (with non-missing satisfaction scores) are new
since 2001, and these new patients account for 17,329 prescriptions.
We deﬁne a “run” as a sequence of one or more prescriptions of a single drug. For example,
if a patient receives a prescription sequence A,A,A,B,C, we say that he has three runs, the length
of each being 3, 1, 1. By this deﬁnition, the ﬁnal sample of 17,329 prescriptions are classiﬁed
into 7,998 runs. An average run consists of 2.17 prescriptions, and an average patient has 1.22
runs in our data. The corresponding numbers are 2.37 and 1.23 in Crawford and Shum (2005).
By deﬁnition, new patients are likely to have fewer runs and fewer prescriptions per run,
which explains why the number of prescriptions declined by 36.6% when we exclude old patients
but the number of patients only goes down by 18.6%. The experiences of older patients may have
contributed to doctor beliefs about average drug quality as of January 1, 2001. The contribution
of this information will be captured in the model since we estimate the prior as of January 1,
2001. What is ignored is how the old patients’ satisfaction reported after 2001 contributes to
the across-patient learning after 2001. We leave this issue for future research.
Conditional on the ﬁnal sample of 6,577 new patients and 17,329 prescriptions, Figure 1
shows that 56% of the patients were involved with prescription NSAIDS only once, and the vast
majority (96%) occurred for no more than 10 times. Table 2 presents the number of prescription
switches between traditional NSAIDS and the three Cox-2s. By deﬁnition, switch does not occur
unless a patient has at least two prescriptions. On average, the switching rate of traditional
NSAIDS (9%) is lower than that of Celebrex (16%), Vioxx (19%) and Bextra(23%). This is
partly because we aggregate diﬀerent brands of traditional NSAIDS into one category.
Table 3 summarizes satisfaction scores by drug and satisfaction questions. On average
(across all ﬁve questions which we denote as satisf12345), patients are more satisﬁed with all three
Cox-2s than they are with traditional NSAIDS, although the speciﬁc satisfaction for eﬀectiveness
11From 2001 to 2003, there are 28,866 NSAIDS prescriptions, of which 27,359 report all ﬁve satisfaction scores.
9is the lowest for Bextra. Within Cox-2s, Celebrex is the best in all ﬁve questions, with Vioxx
being the worst in side eﬀects and Bextra the worst in the other four. These patterns are
hardly signiﬁcant at conventional levels, but they are consistent with the fact that FDA kept
Celebrex on the market but requested withdrawals of both Vioxx and Bextra. Another possible
interpretation is that those who got Bextra are those who are more resistant to other Cox-
2s and doctors prescribed Bextra to them as the last resort. The ﬁve satisfaction measures
are highly correlated (the correlations range from 0.87 to 0.97), so we will use their average
satisf12345 in the ﬁnal structural models. Averaging across the ﬁve satisfaction measures also
allows us to smooth the discreteness in each single measure and therefore to get closer to the
distributional assumption needed in the Bayesian model. We will revisit this issue when we
present the structural results.
All three Cox-2s were heavily marketed. The average monthly advertising expenditures
(pooling detailing, journal advertising, and direct-to-consumer advertising) were 20.3M, 21.4M,
and 10.5M dollars during the time period of 2001 to 2003 for Celebrex, Vioxx and Bextra,
respectively. Although not reported here, the ﬂow of advertising expenditure was comparable
across drugs and even over time. Also, the trend of total advertising is quite similar to the trend
of total prescriptions described previously. Since traditional NSAIDS involve a large number of
brands and most of them had been on the market for a long time, we do not obtain advertising
data for traditional NSAIDS. This is equivalent to assuming traditional NSAIDS have zero
advertising since the start of our sample period.
To complete the picture, we also count the number of news and journal articles related to
Cox-2s from 1999 to 2005. Speciﬁcally, news articles are obtained from the Lexis-Nexis search
of keywords Cox 2, Cox-2, Cox2, celebrex, vioxx, bextra, Cyclooxygenase-2, Cyclooxygenase2,
and Cyclooxygenase 2 across all the U.S. newspapers and magazines. For each relevant article,
we record title, publication date, publication region, and the news source. To focus on Cox-2
inhibitors, we delete articles that talk about Cox-1 and Cox2 enzyme but not inhibitors. Lexis-
Nexis classiﬁes articles into four regions: Midwest, Northeast, Southeast and Western. They
are matched with the nine Census divisions (used in the IPSOS data) by the standard Census
deﬁnition.12 To account for the fact that some newspapers and magazines are read more often
than others, we obtain the total circulation from the Audit Bureau of Circulations. Whenever
applicable, we distinguish circulation on weekdays, Saturday and Sunday, and use the one that
12Except for Southeast, the names of Lexis-Nexis regions match perfectly with those of Census regions. We
interpret “Southeast” in Lexis-Nexis as “South” in Census. The crosswalk between the four Census regions and
the nine Census divisions is available at www.census.gov.
10matches best with the publication date of the article. Articles that do not specify source or do
not have circulation data for the speciﬁed source are excluded.
From article titles, we deﬁne dummy variables indicating whether the article sounds neg-
ative, positive or neutral. For example, “Cox-2s increase the risk of ..” is counted negative but
“Celebrex is easier on stomach” is counted positive. If the title includes both positive and neg-
ative words (or neither), it is counted neutral. The article title also tells us whether the article
focuses on a particular Cox-2 brand or not. If yes, the article is only matched with the speciﬁc
brand. If no, the article is presumably applicable to all the Cox-2s available on the market.
In total, the Lexis-Nexis search results in 973 articles with valid circulation information, which
includes 92 positive, 122 neutral and 756 negative articles.
Academic articles about Cox-2 are gathered from Medline search of the same keywords,
covering all the domestic and international journals in Medline. For each search result, we
record title, abstract, publication date, and the name of the publishing journal. To focus on
human subjects, we rule out articles that examine Cox-2 eﬀects on animals only. Since most
Medline journals are monthly or bi-monthly, we take the ﬁrst day of the ﬁrst issue month as the
publication date. For example, both “April” and “April-June” issues are coded as published on
April 1. Medline oﬀers no regional distinction and more than 80% of articles do not focus on a
speciﬁc brand name, so we assume all the non-speciﬁc articles applies to all the Cox-2s available
on the market. The brand-speciﬁc articles are applied to the mentioned brand only.
Medline journals also diﬀer greatly in terms of impact. To address this, we weigh each
journal with the 2002 Science Gateway Impact Factor.13 In total, we collect 1064 medical articles
between 1999 and 2005, 950 of which have a valid impact factor. Missing impact factor is imputed
by the mode of all the non-missing impacts. Like in Lexis-Nexis, we use title and abstract to
classify Medline articles into negatives (13.44%), positive (28.19%) and neutral (58.36%). Note
that the percent of negative titles is much lower for Medline articles than for news reports (78%).
This suggests that the main eﬀect of Medline articles is likely to come from the non-negatives.
To simplify estimation, we pool positive and neutral as non-negatives but distinguish negatives
and non-negatives for both types of articles.
As a robustness check, we also record whether article authors are aﬃliated with a pharma-
ceutical company, a university, or other institutions, and whether the article talks about eﬃcacy,
side eﬀects, or both. These variables are highly correlated with each other: for example articles
aﬃlated with pharmaceutial companies are more likely to be non-negative and focus on eﬃcacy.
13http://www.sciencegateway.org/impact/if02a.html.
11The high correlation prevents us from identifying the impact of each variable separately. In-
stead, we focus on negatives and non-negatives in the main speciﬁcation, but discuss the eﬀects
of the other variables via a robustness check.
Figure 2 plots the weighted monthly counts where the weight is circulation for news ar-
ticles and journal impact factor for Medline articles. Figures 3 and 4 decompose article counts
into negative and non-negatives. One pattern that stands out most is the dramatic diﬀerence
before and after 2004. Before the Vioxx withdrawal, the 1999-2003 period was characterized by
occasional news and journal articles, in stable ﬂow, and at most times non-negative in nature.
In 2004 and 2005, huge spikes of negative news appear around the Vioxx withdrawal, the ﬁrst
lawsuit against Vioxx, and the withdrawal of Bextra. Medline articles also show a negative spike
at the beginning of 2005, which we interpret as a lag eﬀect of the Vioxx withdrawal in Sept.
2004. Based on these ﬁgures, we suspect the learning process may have changed substantially
after the Vioxx withdrawal. In this paper, we focus on the pre-withdrawal period (2001-2003),
while leaving the post period (2004-2005) for future research.
Finally, on the basis of Table 1, we create three dummy variables to indicate the FDA
updates that occurred in our analysis period (2001-2003). Namely, new warnings added on Apr.
11, 2002 for Vioxx, new warnings added on Nov. 15, 2002 for Bextra, and label change as of
Jun. 7, 2002 for Celebrex.
So far we have documented ﬁve sources of information: patient satisﬁcation, manufacturer
advertising, news articles, Medline articles, and FDA updates. The time-series correlation across
the ﬁve categories are no more than 0.3.14 Such low correlation suggests that diﬀerent sources
may contain diﬀerent types of information and it is possible to identify their impacts separately
in a single model.
3.2 Basic Evidence of Learning
Since patient satisfaction is unique to our data, it is important to demonstrate its link with
prescription decisions. In particular, if doctors learn anything from patient satisfaction, satis-
faction scores should correlate with drug market shares and drug switches within patient. To
conﬁrm this intuition, we run a logit regression on whether the drug prescribed to patient p in
time t is diﬀerent from p’s last prescription (changes within the non-Cox2 NSAIDS are counted
14One complication in calculating the correlations is that all these measures are in diﬀerent time units. We
choose to aggregate up to a monthly level, and then calculate correlations among the monthly level quantities.
12as non-switch). The key independent variable is the satisfaction scores patient p reported for
the drug taken on the last prescription. Since this regression focuses on drug switch, we exclude
ﬁrst prescription (per patient) from our cleaned data, which leaves 2,887 patients and 13,637
prescriptions in the logit sample.
As shown in Table 4 Column (1), the more satisﬁed a patient is with the current prescrip-
tion (i.e. the lower score of satisf12345), the less likely she switches to other brands. Decompos-
ing satisfaction into diﬀerent dimensions, Column (2) shows that the key eﬀect of satisfaction is
driven by drug eﬃcacy (satisf134) instead of “side eﬀects” (satisf2) or “easy to take” (satisf5).
Table 4 Column (3) adds other sources of information into the switch regression. Since
advertising may potentially have an s-shape impact on drug diﬀusion, we use the inverse of the
cumulative total advertising expenditure since FDA approval (i.e. detailing + journal advertising
+ DTC advertising). This mimics the reciprocal model of advertising in the marketing literature
(Lilien et al. 1992). Results are qualitatively similar if we use the total advertising in linear
form. Aside from advertising, we also include Medline and Lexis-Nexis article counts up to t,
and whether t is after the FDA update for the drug of p’s last prescription. The coeﬃcient of
satisf12345 is comparable to that in Column (1). As we expect, advertising and non-negative
news articles deter switch but the other coeﬃcients are either insigniﬁcant (the FDA update
dummy and negative news articles) or counterintuitive (the negative and non-negative Medline
articles). Note that this regression focuses on the information related to the last prescription
taken by the same patient but ignores information of other available brands. This shortcoming
will be corrected in our full model.
Another unique feature of our study is the distinction between across- and within-patient
learning. Does the raw data contain evidence for both types of learning? The simplest way
to demonstrate across-patient learning is tracking nationwide market shares by drug-month.
If across-patient learning exists, the market shares should stabilize over time. To quantify the
stabilization, we compute the standard deviation of the monthly market share within 2001, 2002,
and 2003 separately for each drug. Although not shown, we ﬁnd that the standard deviation
of monthly share declines year by year for all drugs, suggesting that the market shares become
more stable over time.
Because we do not observe the identity of the doctor, we have to assume that the across-
patient information is shared within a speciﬁc geographic area. In the IPSOS data, the most
detailed geographic area that yields a suﬃcient number of prescriptions for information sharing is
census division. If information sharing is restricted to within each of the nine census divisions,
13we should observe signiﬁcant heterogeneity of market shares across regions. In contrast, if
information sharing is nationwide, market shares should be homogenous across regions. To test
for these two extremes, we regress the number of prescription at a month-drug-division level on a
full set of drug dummies and a full set of division dummies. The joint test of all division dummies
having the same coeﬃcient is rejected with a p-value less than 1e-4. A more detailed look at
the division coeﬃcients suggest that each division is diﬀerent from another, which motivates us
to model across-patient learning by census division.15
To better detect within-patient learning, we examine the number of switches in diﬀerent
phases of treatment. Taking each patient as the unit of analysis, we ﬁnd that the number of
switches in the ﬁrst half of a patient’s treatment regimen is always greater than the number of
switches in the second half. This suggests that signiﬁcant learning has taken place within each
patient.
4 Econometric Model and Identiﬁcation
4.1 Model
Consider a situation in which doctor d has concluded that patient p needs a pain relieving
prescription of a ﬁxed length starting from time t, but has not determined which drug is the
best choice. More speciﬁcally, the choice set includes traditional NSAIDS and whatever Cox-2s
that are available at t. In making such choice, the doctor maximizes the patient’s expected
utility for this single prescription.
Here we make three assumptions: in reality the doctor-patient relationship involves a
number of information and incentive issues, and the doctor may not act as a perfect agent
for the patient. We ignore such imperfections because we have no data on individual doctors.
Second, we consider all the traditional NSAIDS as one drug and do not distinguish brands within
this group. The main reason is that traditional NSAIDS involve dozens of brands and we do not
have advertising and article reports for each speciﬁc brand. Treating traditional NSAIDS as one
outside good helps us focus on the tradeoﬀ between traditional NSAIDS and the three brands
of Cox-2 Inhibitors. Third, we assume that each doctor is myopic and focuses on the current
prescription. As detailed below, we assume that a doctor considers all the drug information
15In a later section we assess the robustness of this assumption.
14available to her up to t , but she does not consider how experience learned from the current
prescription would aﬀect her future prescription choice on the same or other patients. For more
discussion on forward-looking behavior, see the robustness checks section (and Crawford and
Shum 2005).











e Qpjt = doctor’s belief about drug j’s quality for patient p at time t;
γ = risk aversion parameter, non-negative. A zero γ implies risk neutrality;
Xpt = patient p’s characteristics at time t;
Zjt = drug j’s characteristics at time t;
pjt = extreme value error.
The information process is modeled as follows. Doctors are uncertain about e Qpjt, which
can be decomposed into two parts: the general quality of drug j that applies to every patient
(referred to as Qj); and the speciﬁc match value between drug j and patient p (referred to as
qpj). The true eﬀect of drug j on patient p is therefore
Qpj = Qj + qpj.
This term is ﬁxed but unknown to the doctor or the researcher. Over the entire population,
we assume qpj is independent and identically distributed according to a normal distribution
N(0,σ2
q0).
When drug j is ﬁrst introduced to the market (or at the beginning of our data set), all
doctors share two priors: for the general quality of drug j , the prior is
e Qj0 ∼ N( ¯ Qj0,σ2
Qj0).
The prior for the patient-drug match (qpj) is mean independent of Qj0 and can be written as:
e qpj0 ∼ N(0,σ2
q0).
Together, the prior for the speciﬁc quality of drug j on patient p is
e Qpj0 = e Qj0 + e qpj0 ∼ N( ¯ Qj0,σ2
Qj0 + σ2
q0).
16As γ goes to zero, the utility function becomes linear.
15We allow both ¯ Qj0 and σQj0 to be drug-speciﬁc. This reﬂects the fact that the initial
information about the average drug quality, whether it is from FDA guidelines, medical research,
or patient experience, may diﬀer across drugs. For example, the prior on Celebrex and Vioxx
is deﬁned as of January 1, 2001 and the prior on Bextra is deﬁned as of March 1, 2002 (the
ﬁrst date that Bextra appears in our data set). Since doctors may have learned about Celebrex
and Vioxx before 2001, the prior should be less dispersed for them than for Bextra. Since we
put no restrictions on σQj0, we can test this conjecture in the data. For simplicity, we assume
the amount of patient heterogeneity (captured by σq0) is the same across all three drugs. We
assume that doctors prior belief on the distribution of patient heterogeneity coincides with the
actual distribution.
We assume doctors located in the same geographic area (say a Census region, a Census
division, or a DMA) share information immediately and extensively. Assuming each prescription
generates one signal, patient p’s satisfaction with drug j at time t, denoted as Rpjt, is a noisy
but unbiased indicator of the true quality:
Rpjt = α0 + αR · (Qj + qpj) + υpjt
where α0 and αR equalize the scales of R and Q, and the signal noise υ conforms to N(0,σ2
υ).
Let nR
pjt denote the number of satisfaction reports from patient p on drug j up to time t,
and ¯ Rpjt denote the average satisfaction across these nR
pjt reports. At time t, doctors in the same
area will use all the nR
pjt signals across all local patients to update their beliefs on the average
drug quality Qj. However, because patients are independent from each other, the experience of
patients other than p does not contain any information about qpj.
With all the patient satisfaction information up to t, doctor’s posterior on the eﬀect of
drug j on patient p can be decomposed into two parts: (1) doctor’s posterior about the general
quality of drug j, and (2) doctor’s posterior about the speciﬁc match between drug j and patient
p. That is:
e Qpjt = e Qjt + e qpjt.





















































































Note that the two posterior beliefs, e Qjt and e qpjt, are correlated because both make use
of the satisfaction information from patient p. While the above formula focuses on one patient,
note that as more patients become involved with the drug over time, the length of the quality
vector increases over time. That is, the size of Σ−1 increases over time. We can show that
the across-patient terms in Σ−1 are all zero. We exploit this special structure and analytically
invert it to get Σ. Inverting Σ−1 implies that the posterior of e qpjt is no longer independent
across patients. This is because all the updates of qpj rely on the update of Qj, which in turn
relies on satisfaction reports from all patients.

































17Thus, maximizing the expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the following,





+ βxjXpt + βzZjt + pjt














The model presented above focuses on one type of signal, patient satisfaction. In reality, there
are many types of signals. FDA updates, media reports, academic articles and manufacturer
advertising could all be viewed as noisy signals of the average drug eﬃcacy that aﬀects doctor’s
Bayesian update. However, estimating the Bayesian role of these signals requires each one of
them have enough variation over time and across patients. In a Bayesian world, lack of variation
adds to the diﬃculty in estimating the precision of a signal. When we allow both advertising and
patient satisfaction to enter the Bayesian updating process, the model estimation has trouble
converging. When it does converge, the variance term corresponding to advertising is extremely
large, suggesting that the monthly advertising data may not provide enough variation to identify
the variance. Given that FDA updates and article data have even less variation than advertising,
it is diﬃcult to model all of them in the framework of Bayesian learning.
To address this computation problem, we model patient satisfaction as a signal that con-
tributes to the Bayesian learning but treat all the other factors as drug attributes (Zjt) that
directly enter the utility function. This does not imply that we assume advertising is solely
persuasive. Rather, both informative and persuasive advertising, if they exist, are captured in
the coeﬃcient of advertising.17
Speciﬁcally, the model described above circumvents the estimation diﬃculty but still allows
all types of factors to play a role in prescription choice. The disadvantage is that we can no
17See Ackerberg 2001 and 2003 for a detailed model that separates informative and persuasive advertising.
18longer rely on the Bayesian structure to describe how historical information in FDA updates,
advertising, news report and Medline articles aﬀect a patient’s expected utility. Rather, we deﬁne
Zjt as a vector, where each non-advertising element corresponds to the log of the cumulative sum
of one factor. To better capture a potential s-shape impact of advertising, we use the inverse
of cumulative total advertising (detailing + journal advertising + DTC) instead of advertising
itself (Lilien et al. 1992).
Since the model treats patient satisfaction and other sources of information diﬀerently,
the magnitudes of their structural coeﬃcients are not directly comparable. As shown below, we
evaluate their relative importance by (1) comparing models with and without certain informa-
tion, and (2) using our preferred model to predict drug diﬀusion in (hypothetical) scenarios that
vary by information structure.
Another estimation issue is whether we should treat traditional NSAIDS, Celebrex, Vioxx
and Bextra as four branches in a simple logit, or assume a nested logit structure where a doctor
ﬁrst chooses between traditional NSAIDS and Cox-2, and then decides which brand is the best
within the nest of Cox-2. We have estimated both, results are almost identical (in both likelihood
value and coeﬃcient magnitude). The parameter that describes the substitutability of the two
nests is estimated at 0.99, which implies that the nested logit is analytically the same as the
simple logit. In light of this ﬁnding, we only report the results based on the simple logit model.
4.3 Identiﬁcation
Overall, the econometric model includes four sets of parameters: [βxj,βz] capture the eﬀects of
individual demographics and drug attributes, [ ¯ Qj0,σQj0,σq0] capture doctor’s prior, [α0,αR,συ]
capture the importance of patient satisfaction, and γ captures doctor’s risk preference. As
discussed above, FDA updates, inverse of manufacturer advertising, news reports, and Medline
articles are treated as drug attributes, and their impact on patient utility are captured in βz.
The identiﬁcation of βxj comes from the time-invariant prescription pattern across pa-
tients. For example, if Cox-2 prescriptions tend to be concentrated in the elderly, it translates
into a signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient corresponding to the interaction of Cox-2 and age.
Similarly, βz is identiﬁed from the co-movements of drug market shares and various drug infor-
mation. In principle, causality could go either way for advertising: on the one hand, advertising
may trigger sales; on the other hand, historical or predicted sales patterns may motivate changes
in advertising intensity. This implies that the coeﬃcient for advertising is better interpreted as
19the correlation between advertising and sales rather than a causal eﬀect.
The prior means of drug quality, ¯ Qj0, are identiﬁed from initial market shares. Because
we include traditional NSAIDS as the outside good whose eﬃcacy is well-known to doctors, we
normalize its Q as zero. The prior of the three Cox-2s are all identiﬁed relative to the traditional
NSAIDS. However, patient satisfaction R is reported in absolute terms. Apparently, the noise
in R, denoted by συ, is determined by the heterogeneity in R. Since we assume R equals a
linear function of true quality Qpj plus noise, we can derive συ by regressing Rpjt on a full set of
patient-drug dummies and calculating the standard deviation of the residuals. This procedure
does not require any prescription data, so we estimate συ and ﬁx it when estimating the full
model.
Parameters, α0 and αR, describe the scale diﬀerence between satisfaction R and true
quality Qpj. However, since we do not know Qpj, they must be proxied by the posteriors, which
are in turn reﬂected in evolving market shares. If the diﬀusion path is ﬂat for each drug, the
lack of updating implies that patient satisfaction has little impact, which amounts to αR = 0. If
drug j’s diﬀusion path is positively related to drug j’s average satisfaction over time, it implies
a signiﬁcant, positive αR. The other term, α0, is simply an intercept that is derived from the
relative scale of R and Q.
The dispersion on the prior of the average quality of drug j, namely σQj0, is identiﬁed by
the speed of diﬀusion. According to the Bayesian formula, the mean of the posterior, ¯ Qjt, is
essentially a weighted average between R and the prior mean ¯ Qj0, while the weights are inversely
related to the amount of noise in the two terms. Since we already identify the noise of R, a
relatively small (large) σQj0 implies that doctors believe the prior is relatively precise (noisy)
and therefore put less (more) weight on patient satisfaction, which results in slow (fast) learning.
Similarly, the dispersion on the prior of patient-drug match, namely σq0, is identiﬁed by
how fast doctors update their patient-speciﬁc beliefs. Small (large) σq0 implies that patient p’s
doctor is reluctant (eager) to revise her prior after she receives p’s satisfaction report, because
she thinks the report is relatively noisy (precise).
The risk aversion parameter, γ, is identiﬁed by a functional form restriction. As noted in
Coscelli and Shum (2004), the data only tell us about the term ¯ Qpjt− 1
2γσ2
e Qpjt
. The fact that we
assumed a CARA utility function leads to a linear decomposition into the mean and variance
terms.
205 Results
As described in Section 3, we focus on the patients that ﬁrst appear in the data on or after
January 1, 2001. The analysis sample ends at December 31, 2003 and is conditional on the
prescriptions that come with valid answers for all ﬁve satisfaction questions. The ﬁnal sample
involves 6,577 patients and 17,329 prescriptions.
5.1 Benchmark Model without Learning
Before estimating the structural model, we check two benchmark models. These benchmarks
utilize a discrete choice framework but do not incorporate a learning structure. Comparing them
with our structural model will help us understand the importance of the learning structure.
Speciﬁcally, Benchmark I estimates the prescription choice within traditional NSAIDS and the
three brands of Cox-2s, assuming that the utility of patient p using drug j is:
Upjt = βj0 + βssatisfjt + βxjXpt + βzZjt + pjt.
Here satisfjt denotes the average satisfaction reported for drug j up to time t. To capture the
fundamental diﬀerence across drugs, we also include a set of drug dummies, whose impacts on
utility are captured by coeﬃcients βj0.
Benchmark II omits patient satisfaction in the utility function so that a comparison of the
two benchmark models would highlight the role of patient satisfaction. Speciﬁcally, the utility
function for Benchmark II is:
Upjt = βj0 + βxjXpt + βzZjt + pjt.
Assuming logit errors, we can write out the probability of patient p choosing drug j and
maximize the overall likelihood. We normalize the satisfaction measure as 6 − satisf12345 so
that a positive coeﬃcient on patient satisfaction implies that the more satisﬁed patients are,
the better the drug choice is. Since the benchmark models do not incorporate the learning
structure, in order to capture all the information available up to the study period, we compute
the satisfaction variable as the average of all satisfaction reports up to one month before the
prescription month.
To be consistent with the structural model, we use the inverse of total advertising cu-
mulated from the day of drug entry up to one month before the prescription month. We have
21tried other deﬁnitions, including the cumulative sum itself (with or without log), the advertising
ﬂow (instead of cumulative sum), and the monthly average of the cumulative sum. Results are
qualitatively similar.
To estimate the extent to which doctors prescribe based on observable patient demo-
graphics, we allow the coeﬃcient of patient demographics (βxj) to vary by whether drug j is a
traditional NSAIDS or a Cox-2. In other words, these coeﬃcients capture doctors’ preferences
between traditional NSAIDS and Cox-2s, but not within Cox-2s. Allowing βxj to vary by Cox-2
brand does not change the results.18
As shown in Table 5, when we include patient satisfaction and other sources of information
in Benchmark I, patient satisfaction has a positive and signiﬁcant impact for all three Cox-2s.
The satisfaction coeﬃcient is larger for Bextra, probably because Bextra is newer than the other
two drugs. In terms of other information, the coeﬃcient of inverse advertising is negative as
expected but indistinguishable from zero at the 95% conﬁdence level. The coeﬃcients for Lexis-
Nexis articles are signiﬁcantly positive (and more prominent in the non-negative ones), but both
coeﬃcients for negative and non-negative Medline articles are insigniﬁcant. In contrast, the
coeﬃcient of FDA updates is positive (and marginally signiﬁcant), which is surprising given the
fact that most FDA updates have negative content. The three intercepts suggest that Celebrex
and Vioxx are viewed better than Bextra, everything else being equal. This reﬂects the fact
that Bextra has the smallest market share among the three Cox-2s. In demographics, older,
high-income males with private health insurance are more likely to receive Cox-2 prescriptions.
Omitting patient satisfaction leads to a worse ﬁt in Benchmark II. In comparison with
Benchmark I, advertising appears to be much more important in this case. Further, the coef-
ﬁcient of the Bextra dummy is no longer worse than those of Celebrex and Vioxx. As we see
below, these results suggest that a discrete choice model without patient satisfaction is subject
to omitted variable bias.
5.2 Model with Learning
The results on the two benchmark models encourage us to think more systematically about
patient satisfaction. Accordingly, the structural model adds a Bayesian learning structure on
top of the classical discrete choice framework.
18Another way to address patient demographics is including them as concomitant variables, as suggested in
Dayton and Macready (1988).
22Recall that each individual satisfaction measure is discrete but the ﬁve satisfaction mea-
sures are very closely correlated (with correlation coeﬃcient ranging between 0.87 and 0.97).
These high correlations motivate us to use satisf12345 as a continuous measure of Rpjt. As dis-
cussed in Section 4.2, we estimate the structural model in two steps: ﬁrst, we regress Rpjt on a
full set of patient-drug (pj) dummies, and compute the residuals’ standard deviation. According
to our model, this standard deviation gives us an unbiased estimate of συ. With R-square 0.697,
the regression produces συ = 0.496. Ideally, we need the residual to be normally distributed so
that the model can yield close solutions to the posterior belief. Although not shown here, a plot
of the histogram of these residuals shows that the distribution is symmetric and close to the bell
shape. In the second step, we set συ at 0.496 and search for the best parameters that maximize
the overall log likelihood.
Results reported below assume that doctors talk to each other within a census division.
As discussed in Secton 3, we observe signiﬁcant heterogeneity of market shares across divisions,
which suggests that information is not fully shared across divisions. As a conﬁrmation, we also
run the structural model assuming nationwide information pooling and ﬁnd that it generates a
signiﬁcantly worse ﬁt to the data.
Table 6 presents three sets of structural results: Column (1) presents a BASIC model that
incorporates all sources of information. To gauge the relative importance of within-patient and
across-patient learning, Column (2) ignores within-patient learning (by setting σq0 = 0) and
Column (3) ignores across-patient learning (by setting σQj0 = 0).
All three models set the risk parameter as zero (which implies risk-neutrality). When
we estimate the full model with risk preference, the risk parameter is extremely close to zero
(ˆ γ = 1.2e − 23 with t-stat less than 0.01). This implies that prescription choice has little to
do with risk preference: a patient stays on the old prescription not because her doctor is afraid
of trying a new brand. Rather, it is probably because the patient is satisﬁed with the old
prescription, or because the other sources of information do not produce any signiﬁcant news
against the old brand. Since including the risk parameter prolongs estimation a great deal and
all the other parameters do not change much when we set γ = 0, we only report results that
assume risk neutrality.
Three ﬁndings stand out in Table 6. First, there is signiﬁcant learning from patient
satisfaction. On the one hand, the positive, signiﬁcant estimate of αR suggests that doctors
believe the satisfaction reports from patients are correlated with drug eﬃcacy and therefore
use them to update the prior. On the other hand, the magnitudes of σQj0 are much smaller
23than both the noise in the satisfaction report (i.e. συ) and the dispersion of patient-drug match
(i.e. σq0). This suggests that doctors hold strong priors about the average eﬃcacy of the three
drugs. As a result, although they value the satisfaction reports, the updating on the general
drug quality is slow. In comparison, the learning on the speciﬁc match between a drug and a
patient is faster, because the magnitude of σq0 is much closer to that of συ.
This interpretation is consistent with the comparison across Columns (1), (2) and (3). The
overall likelihood in Column (1) (-11376) is signiﬁcantly better than that in Columns (2) and
(3) (-17259, -11565), suggesting that both across- and within-patient learning are important
in our data. However, the likelihood (and point estimates) in Column (3) is much closer to
Column (1). This implies that a larger part of the data variation is driven by within-patient
learning, the same conclusion as we have inferred from the relative magnitudes of σq0, σQj0,
and συ. Along the same lines, we note that structural models including within-patient learning
(Columns (1) and (3)) ﬁt the data much better than the benchmark models in Table 5, but αR
becomes insigniﬁcant when we ignore within-patient learning in Column (2).
Coeﬃcients corresponding to other sources of information are mixed. As we expect, inverse
of advertising is signiﬁcantly negative. However, since drug manufacturers may change advertis-
ing intensity according to predicted sales change in the near future, this coeﬃcient may capture
some demand factor that manufacturers observe but we do not. The concern of endogeneity
prompts us to treat advertising as a pure control and not as having any causal eﬀect.
News articles have a positive inﬂuence on prescriptions, no matter whether these titles
sound negative or non-negative. This suggests that the major role of news articles is informing
doctors/patients of the existence of Cox-2s, rather than revealing the quality of Cox-2s. Statis-
tically speaking, negative news are even more signiﬁcant, probably because most news articles
are negative. In contrast, a medical article about Cox-2s has a signiﬁcant negative impact on
prescription sales, even if its title and abstract are non-negative. Note that most of the non-
negative articles are neutral, which mentions both positive and negative eﬀects of Cox-2s. Our
ﬁndings suggest that doctors lay more emphasis on the negative contents of Medline articles,
or tend to interpret Medline publication as a negative signal against Cox-2s. The coeﬃcient of
FDA update is negative as we expect, but statistically indistinguishable from zero. One possible
explanation is the FDA updates lag behind Medline articles and therefore deliver little new
information to doctors.
To better understand the relative importance of information, Table 7 re-estimates the BA-
SIC model by excluding news reports (Column (2)) or medical articles (Column (3)). Comparing
24Column (3) with the BASIC model (results repeated in Table 7 Column (1)), we ﬁnd that ex-
cluding Medline articles does not aﬀect the qualitative role of patient satisfaction, but it makes
the coeﬃcient of the FDA updates much more negative than in the BASIC model (-0.6988, with
t-stat -14.97) versus -0.0803 (with t-stat -1.05). The coeﬃcient magnitude for advertising also
increases substantially. In comparison, excluding news reports alone (Column (2)) produces
more similar results to the BASIC model. FDA updates seem to be a redundant follow-up from
the medical literature: once we control for Medline articles, the coeﬃcient of FDA updates is
close to zero. But negative news articles continue to have a positive impact on drug prescription,
with or without the control of Medline articles. This suggests that news articles (even if with
negative titles) probably inform patients about the availability of Cox-2s. Patients then bring
this information to the doctor’s notice, and this informative role is not closely correlated with
professional opinion about Cox-2s.
Comparing estimates within the three Cox-2s, we ﬁnd the prior mean (Q0) of Bextra is
always smaller than that of Vioxx and Celebrex. This is consistent with the small market share
of Bextra. In all speciﬁcations, the prior dispersion (σQ0) is greater for Bextra than for Celebrex
and Vioxx. This ﬁnding reﬂects the late entry of Bextra.
Some sensitivity occurs in the absolute magnitude of Q0: the three Q0s are positive in the
BASIC model; but when we exclude Medline articles, they all turn negative (Table 7 Column
(3)). This seemingly sensitive result is indeed sensible: because the BASIC model controls for
the number of Medline articles in the utility function, Q0 should be interpreted as the prior
mean of a Cox-2 conditional on non-zero Medline articles. When we omit Medline articles, the
estimated Q0 represents the prior mean of a Cox-2 conditional on its average count of Medline
articles. Since most Medline articles have a negative eﬀect on the probability of choosing Cox-2,
this explains why Q0 turns negative if we exclude Medline articles.
The coeﬃcients of demographics are stable across speciﬁcations. Results suggest that
older, better-income, and better educated males have a greater tendency of receiving Cox-2.
Diﬀerent insurance variables have diﬀerent signs: being privately insured is associated with
a greater likelihood of receiving Cox-2, but drug insurance is negatively correlated with Cox-
2 prescription. The latter may be explained by the non-favorable formulary status of Cox-2
relative to traditional NSAIDS. However, the potential for measurement errors in these insurance
variables suggest that we regard these variables as pure controls rather than ascribe any speciﬁc
economic meaning. All these ﬁndings are similar to what we have seen in the benchmark models
without learning (Table 5).
25Overall, results suggest that patient satisfaction, advertising, news reports and the medical
literature are all important in prescription choice. Speciﬁcally, at the beginning of 2001 and upon
the Bextra entry in January 2002, doctors held a strong prior belief about the eﬃcacy of Celebrex,
Vioxx, and Bextra, and learned gradually from patient satisfaction. We ﬁnd evidence for both
across- and within-patient learning, but within-patient learning explains much more variation in
the data. Other sources of information are important as well: news articles and advertising are
positively correlated with prescription, but Medline articles appear to be detrimental for drug
sales. The impact of FDA updates is close to zero once we control for Medline articles. This
suggests that the contents of FDA updates have already been included in Medline articles and
therefore deliver little new information to doctors.
5.3 Model with Learning and Unobserved Heterogeneity
One may argue that a doctor observes more patient-speciﬁc information than just her satisfaction
before writing any prescription. Such information, including the patient’s medical history and
the nature of her demand for pain relief, may inform the doctor about whether the patient is
suitable for a speciﬁc drug. Because we as researchers do not observe such information, we might
mis-attribute some unobserved heterogeneity to learning.










We estimate three models with random eﬀects, the ﬁrst two assume θpj conforms to
a discrete distribution that includes two or three “types” of patients, while the third model
assumes θpj is normal (N(0,σθj), i.i.d. across patients). 19
As shown in Table 8 Columns (2) and (3), allowing two or three distinct patient types
improves the model ﬁt a great deal (log L changes from -11376 to -10181 and -10086) but the
main results remain stable. Similar to the BASIC model, doctors learn from patient feedback
and the learning is more within-patient than across-patients. Inverse advertising still has a
negative coeﬃcient, but news articles are no longer signiﬁcant. In comparison, the coeﬃcients
of medical articles remain negative and highly signiﬁcant. In fact, controlling for 3 patient types
increases the magnitudes of the medical article coeﬃcients by about 50% (as compared to the
BASIC model), implying that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity may lead to biased estimates.
19For the third model, we use simulated MLE with 20 draws.
26The model with normal random eﬀects (Table 8, Column (4)) produces qualitatively sim-
ilar parameter estimates and the log likelihood is worse than what we get with two patient
types. Thus, the three-patient-type model captures most unobserved heterogeneity. In addi-
tion, the BIC criterion favors the 3-type model, too. Therefore, we denote the 3-type model as
our preferred model and use it for counterfactual simulations at the end of this section.
5.4 Robustness Checks
In this subsection we discuss several robustness checks on the BASIC model.
Forward-looking behavior of physicians: In contrast to several other researches that
have studied forward-looking behavior (Crawford and Shum 2005, Ching 2005, Erdem and Keane
1996), our model assumes that each doctor focuses only on the current prescription situation.
We do not model forward-looking not only because it simpliﬁes the econometric model, but also
because of the nature of the product category that we look at. In the data, a large proportion
of patients have only one prescription and the potential risk of malpractice is likely to prevent
doctors from experimenting. In addition, we carried out the following simple test and did not
ﬁnd evidence supporting the forward-looking hypothesis.
Consider a risk neutral patient who is completely new to the Cox-2 category after all
three Cox-2s become available. Since Bextra is the newest member in the category, it is by
deﬁnition the least known alternative. If the patient’s doctor is forward looking, the motivation
to experiment would lead him to ﬁrst prescribe Bextra to collect information. If on the other
hand the prescription is driven by what the doctor has already learned about the drug quality,
then he is more likely to prescribe either of the two older drugs that on average have greater
posterior mean quality than Bextra. Indeed, among 1,255 such new patients, only 200 were given
Bextra as their ﬁrst prescription while the remaining majority were prescribed either Celebrex
or Vioxx.
Therefore, we believe that although experimentation might be relevant for some product
categories, it is unlikely to be a key issue for our study.
Sampling weights: While our data contain a nationally representative sample of house-
holds, we do not observe the whole population. In reality, doctors may use the experience of all
patients to form beliefs about drug quality. Intuitively, ignoring part of the population tends to
miss part of the across-patient learning and therefore mis-characterize the importance of across-
27and within-patient learning.
To address this issue, we make use of sampling weights that are available to us in the data.20
If individual A has a sampling weight of 100, we assume doctors (in A’s Census division) observe
100 patients whose demographics, prescription history, and satisfaction index are identical to
A’s. By this assumption, we inﬂate the individual records by sampling weights and then re-
estimate the BASIC model. Statistically speaking, this is equivalent to asserting that, when
doctors summarize patient feedback into the posterior belief, they assign more importance to
the patients who represent more of the population in our original data.
Results incorporating sampling weight are presented in Table 9 Column (2). 21 Compared
with the unweighted results (Table 9 Column (1)), adding sampling weights does not change
qualitative conclusions: αR is still positive and highly signiﬁcant, implying that doctors learn
from patient feedback. Like before, estimated σq0 is much larger than the three σQ0. This
indicates that the prior of patient-drug match is more dispersed than the prior of average drug
quality, hence doctors learn faster within a patient than across patients. In fact, adding sampling
weights enlarges the diﬀerence between σq0 and σQ0, which suggests that our unweighted results
may even underestimate the importance of within-patient learning. This change is intuitive be-
cause across-patient learning is identiﬁed from prescription correlations across diﬀerent patients.
When we inﬂate the data by sampling weights, we attenuate the observed correlation among
a greater population, which reduces the amount of learning obtained from each single patient.
Parameters on demographics and the other information variables hardly change. Since the log
likelihood (-11375) is extremely similar to what we get from the unweighted model (-11376), we
are conﬁdent that our main results (unweighted) are robust to including sampling weights.
Functional form of advertising: In the BASIC model, we use the inverse of total
cumulative advertising, which entails three assumptions: ﬁrst, drug diﬀusion follows a reciprocal
model as dictated by the inverse of advertising; second, advertising does not depreciate over time;
third, diﬀerent forms of advertising are pooled together.
20IPSOS has a sophisticated program that assigns weights to panelists. The weights change with time. So we
obtained weights for the time period that is relevant for our study. These weights reﬂect the overall representa-
tiveness of each panelist during a speciﬁc time period.
21We are able to obtain sampling weights for only a subset of individuals in our data. We use two steps to
impute the missing weights. First, focusing on the individuals that have sampling weights, we regress the reported
weights on a polynomial function of demographic variables and whether the studied individual has returned the
diary on a regular basis. In the second step, we use the predicted relationship to predict sampling weights for the
rest of the sample. Results reported in Table 9 are based on the imputed weights.
28Strictly speaking, all three assumptions are subject to question. Since any functional form
of advertising is arbitrary, we re-estimate the BASIC model with many alternative speciﬁcations:
(1) using advertising or log advertising instead of the inverse; (2) using detailing and DTCA
separately instead of the total of detailing, journal advertising and DTCA; (3) using ﬂow of
advertising instead of the cumulative sum; (4) estimating monthly depreciation rates for detailing
and DTCA; and (5) lagging advertising by 3,6,9 and 12 months.
Across these speciﬁcations, the qualitative results on all the non-advertising variables are
similar to what we had before, but the coeﬃcient(s) on advertising is sensitive to speciﬁcations.
As shown in Table 9 Column (3), when we include log(detailing) and log(DTCA) separately,
both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant but detailing is positive while DTCA is negative. We suspect
the negative sign of DTCA is due to endogenous determination of DTCA or omitted variable
bias. In theory, the same concern exists for any other type of advertising. Because we do not
have valid instruments to control for such endogeneity, we treat advertising as a control and do
not interpret its coeﬃcient as having a causal eﬀect. Fortunately, the eﬀects of all the other
variables are stable across speciﬁcations. Since these non-advertising variables are beyond the
control of drug manufacturers, they are immune from reverse causality.
Patient demographics: Strictly speaking, patient demographics may play two roles in
prescription decisions: ﬁrst, doctors may have a ﬁxed view of drugs that match best with various
demographic characteristics. To fully account for such practice, we should allow the coeﬃcients
of each patient’s demographics (βxj) to vary by brand for each of the 4 alternatives, instead
of Cox-2s versus traditional NSAIDS. Given the large number of demographics included in the
basic model, we estimate brand-speciﬁc βxj on the demographic variable that has the most
predictive power in prescription decision – patient age. The re-estimated basic model does not
show much improvement in the likelihood (from -11376 to -11374) and the magnitude of the
age coeﬃcient is similar across the three Cox-2 brands. At the same time, results on all the
information variables remain unchanged.
Another channel for patient demographics to inﬂuence prescription decisions is through
the learning structure. It is not diﬃcult to see that doctors may be more likely to apply the
experience of elderly male patients to other elderly males than to young females. However, it is
extremely diﬃcult to account for demographic-speciﬁc learning in the structural model, because
some key demographic variables are continuous (say age) and any demographic grouping seems
arbitrary. Keeping this caveat in mind, we emphasize that the learning estimates presented in
this paper represent the average amount of learning across all demographic groups.
29Medline articles: The negative coeﬃcient on non-negative medline articles is counter-
intuitive. To better understand the statistical forces underlying this coeﬃcient, we conduct a
number of robustness checks.
First, we reestimate the basic model by decomposing the non-negative medline articles
into positive and neutral articles. Results suggest that the negative coeﬃcient of non-negative
articles is primarily driven by a negative response to positive articles. Once we control for
positive articles separately, the response to neutral articles becomes positive but insigiﬁcant
with 95% conﬁdence level.
To address the suspicion that doctors may view a positive article from a pharmaceutical
company employee as a negative signal, we conduct a second robustness check by including
variables for author aﬃlation. Results suggest a strong negative response to company aﬃlation
and including aﬃliation reduces the signiﬁcance of the responses to positive/negative/neutral
articles. In comparison, including variables describing whether an article focues on eﬃcacy or
side eﬀects generate very noisy results. Among a number of speciﬁcations we have tried, only
in one case do we observe negative and signiﬁcant response to side-eﬀects articles. The eﬃcacy
indicator is never signiﬁcant.
We suspect many of the noisy results are driven by the high correlations across the diﬀerent
sets of variables: for example, company-aﬃliated articles are more likely to be positive and
positive articles are more likely to focus on eﬃcacy instead of side eﬀects. Thus including all of
them in one speciﬁcation is likely to generate a collinearity problem. Given that all the other
information variables do not change much when we try diﬀerent speciﬁcations on the medline
articles, we believe the basic model is a reasonable simpliﬁcation.
5.5 Model Fit and Counterfactual Predictions
This subsection examines the relative importance of diﬀerent sources of information. Treating
the BASIC model with 3-patient-type random eﬀects (Table 8 Column (3)) as our preferred
model, we predict the number of prescriptions for four scenarios and compare them with the
actual data.
The ﬁrst scenario is our preferred model, which takes all sources of information as given
and reports the predicted prescription counts by drug-month. This scenario indicates a good
ﬁt to the data: As shown in Table 10, for each of the 17,329 prescriptions considered in our
30estimation sample, we are able to predict the actual prescription choice correctly 85.5% of the
time. In comparison, the percentage of correct prediction is 61.2% for the logit model without
learning structure, 79.0% for the basic model, 78.4% for the basic model with within-patient
learning only, and 60.6% for the basic model with across-patient learning only. Another measure
of model ﬁt is the percent of market share deviations from the actual data. Taking month-drug
as the unit of observation, our preferred model has an average absolute percentage deviation of
26.5% if we focus on the prediction of Cox-2s, or 20.7% if the calculation includes non-Cox2s.22
This suggests that, on average, our prediction of a Cox-2’s monthly market share deviates from
its actual share by 26.5%.
The second scenario assumes that FDA did not issue any updates during the study period
(2001-2003). The third scenario assumes that patient feedback is shared nationwide instead of
within a census division. This scenario reﬂects a recent proposal of FDA setting up a nationwide
database to share patient feedback among doctors (Salter 2005). The fourth scenario assumes
double counts of medical articles. Since our article counts are weighted by journal impact
factor, we can achieve these changes by publishing the same articles in more important journals.
Readers can also interpret the last scenario as a greater intensity of “academic detailing”, which
has also been proposed as a potential improvement in FDA’s post-marketing surveillance (Ray
and Stein 2006).
Comparing the three hypothetical scenarios against the actual data, Table 11 reports the
predicted percentage change in the market share of Celebrex, Vioxx, Bextra and non-Cox2s
from January 2001 to December 2003. Excluding FDA updates makes virtually no change. This
conﬁrms the conclusion that FDA updates tend to follow the medical literature and therefore
deliver no new information. Expanding census division learning to the national level makes a
big diﬀerence: because patients report higher satisfaction for Celebrex than for Vioxx, Bextra,
or traditional NSAIDS (see summary in Table 3), a nationwide database encourages switching
towards Cox-2 inhibitors. The percentage change of market share is the lowest for Celebrex
because Celebrex has the largest sales among the three Cox-2 inhibitors. The eﬀect of more
Medline publications is opposite to pooling patient feedback: compared to the actual market
shares , doubling Medline articles would increase the market share of traditional NSAIDS by
17.03%, while depressing the market share of Cox-2 inhibitors by 25-30%.
22For each month-drug, absolute percentage deviation is deﬁned as abs(predicted number of RX - actual number
of RX) / actual number of RX. We then average this index across all month-drugs for each Cox-2 (which yields
26.5%) or for all four drugs (which yields 20.7%).
316 Conclusion
Acquiring information about drug eﬃcacy is not only at the center of FDA regulations, but also
the key element driving each prescription decision in doctor’s oﬃce. Using a unique data set
from patient diaries, we estimate how patient satisfaction and other factors aﬀect the diﬀusion
of Cox-2 inhibitors from 2001 to 2003. Our results suggest that prescription choice is sensitive
to many sources of information, including patient satisfaction, Medline articles, news report
and manufacturer advertising. In comparison, the impact of FDA updates is close to zero once
we control for Medline articles. This suggests that the contents of FDA updates have already
been included in Medline articles and therefore deliver no new information to doctors. This also
conﬁrms the view that FDA postmarketing surveillance lags behind the medical literature and
has room to improve.
According to our counterfactual predictions, suppressing FDA updates has no impact
on market shares. In contrast, setting up a nationwide database of patient feedback encourages
doctors to switch from traditional NSAIDS to Cox-2s, but increasing Medline publications about
Cox-2s steals market share away from Cox-2s. This suggests that patient feedback and academic
articles may reﬂect diﬀerent dimensions of drug quality, and these two sources of information
do not necessarily substitute for each other.
Despite our eﬀorts devoted at gathering every piece of information about Cox-2, our results
are subject to several limitations: ﬁrst of all, the patient diary data do not contain doctor
identities and only represents a sample of all the Cox-2 patients. Both tend to undermine our
ability to precisely estimate how doctors learn across patients. Second, our patient satisfaction
data are self-reported. This does not necessarily generate a speciﬁc bias as compared to the
patients’ real experiences, but it does put more weight on the symptoms that patients can
observe easily and care to report to their doctors. Third, although our model of patient-drug
match already incorporates heterogeneity reﬂected in the satisfaction data, it is possible that
there remain some patient attributes observable to doctors but not to researchers. We use
patient-drug random eﬀects to control for such unobserved heterogeneity, but we might still be
ignoring some sources of heterogeneity. Finally, manufacturers may advertise more in a period
that they expect to have low sales, thus introducing an endogeneity problem. This suggests that
the coeﬃcients of advertising should be interpreted as the correlation between advertising and
prescription choice, rather than as having a causal impact.
In summary, this is a ﬁrst attempt at using actual consumer (or patient) feedback infor-
32mation in the context of a learning model. Future research can look at including other sources
of information within the formal learning framework proposed here.
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Figure 1: Number of Rx's per Patient
 












Figure 2: Total articles weighted 
(1 lexis-nexis=one Wall Street Journal article















Figure 3: Medline articles weighted by 













Figure 4: Lexis-Nexis articles weighted 




Source of Figures 2-4: Lexis-Nexis 1999-2005 for news articles. Medline 1999-2005 for journal articles. 
News articles are weighted by newspaper circulations reported by the Audit Bureau of Circulations 
(www.accessabs.com). Journal articles are weighted by the 2002 impact factor from Science Gateway 
(http://www.sciencegateway.org/impact/if02a.html). Positive, neutral and negative are defined by authors' 
reading of article title and abstract. 
 36Table 1: Regulatory history of Cox-2s 
 
Brand Date  FDA  Decision 
Celebrex  Dec. 31, 1998  Approval for rheumatoid and osteoarthritis 
  Dec. 23, 1999  Approval for reducing the number of intestinal polyps 
in patients with familial adenomatous polyposis (FAP) 
  Jun. 7, 2002  Labeling change because the Celecoxib Long-term 
Arthritis Safety Study (CLASS) does not associate 
Celebrex with significantly less GI risk as compared to 
traditional NSAIDS (ibuprofen or diclofenac) 
  Dec. 23, 2004  Issuing a Public Health Advisory on an increased 
cardiovascular risk in association with Cox-2s and 
traditional NSAIDS based on long-term clinical trials 
  Apr. 7, 2005  New labeling that highlights cardiovascular risk 
Vioxx  May 20, 1999  Approved for osteoarthritis and pain
  Apr. 11, 2002  Approved for rheumatoid arthritis
New warnings concerning reduced GI risk and 
increased cadiovascular risk based on the Vioxx 
Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR) 
  Sept. 30, 2004  Withdrawal (voluntary by Merck)
Bextra  Nov. 16, 2001  Approved for osteoarthritis and rheumatoid arthritis 
  Nov. 15, 2002  New warnings on life-threatening skin irritations 
  Dec. 9, 2004  More warnings on skin irritations and cardiovascular 
risk 
  Dec. 23, 2004  Issuing a Public Health Advisory on an increased 
cardiovascular risk in association with Cox-2s and 
traditional NSAIDS based on long-term clinical trials 
  Apr. 7, 2005  Withdrawal (by Pfizer)
 37Table 2: Switching matrix 
 
 Frequency  Celebrex  Vioxx  Bextra AllothRx Switching rate 
Celebrex  1949 100 41 237 0.16 
Vioxx  96 1598  47 229 0.19 
Bextra  25 22  389 71 0.23 
AllothRx  228 228 97 5395 0.09 
 
Note: Switches are from row to column. Conditional on patients who started after Jan.1, 2001 






Table 3: Mean and standard deviation of satisfaction scores  
(total: 6,577 patients 17,329 observations)  
 
(1=extremely satisfied, 5=extremely dissatisfied) 
 































































Table 4: Logit model on brand switching 
 
Dependent Variable: switch=1 if switch brand from the last period (taking all traditional NSAIDS as one brand) 
Independent Variables:   satisfaction scores (1=extremely satisfied, 5=extremely dissatisfied) reported in the last period, 
advertising (measured as the inverse of cumulative sum of total advertising expenditures up to 
the previous month), article counts (measured as the log of cumulative sum of weighted articles 
up to the previous day), and FDA update dummy  
 
   (1)     (2)     (3)    
   Coefficients     Coefficients     Coefficients    
   [t-stat]    [t-stat]     [t-stat]    
Overall satisfication (satisf12345)  0.1269 *** 0.1406  *** 
   [4.1958][ 4.5999]  
Drug effectiveness (satisf134)     0.1318  ***     
   [3.0934]   
Side effects (satisf2)  0.0399    
      [ 1.0477]      
Ease to take (satisf5)  -0.0666 *    
   [-1.7272]   
Inverse of Advertising       0.8509  * 
   [1.8357]  
Medline article (neg)  -0.6724  ** 
       [ -2.4953]   
Medline article (non-neg)  1.0848  ** 
  [2.5531]  
Lexis article (neg)       0.037   
  [0.7903]  
Lexis article (non-neg)  -0.0852  * 
       [ -1.7889]   
After FDA updates  0.0088   
  [0.0572]  
Intercept  -2.1172 *** -2.1241 ***  -5.3796 *** 
   [-33.1160][ -32.4455][ -3.4811]  
Log likelihood  -4189.9 -4186.9 -4092.7    
# of patients  2887  2887   2887    
# of prescriptions  13639  13639   13639    
Source: IPSOS patient diary data 2001 – 2003.  
T-statistics in brackets. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
  Table 5: Benchmark models – Discrete choice model without learning structure 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficients Coefficients 
 [t-stat]    [t-stat]   
Intercept of Celebrex  -4.6079 *** -2.1321  ***
 [ -5.3824] [-2.8039] 
Intercept of Vioxx  -3.5984  ***  -2.2336  *** 
 [ -4.1337]    [-2.8906]   
Intercept of Bextra  -9.8366 *** -2.8402  ***
 [ -9.2781]    [-3.6176]   
(6-Satisf12345) for Celebrex  0.5446  ***     
 [ 7.8586]  
(6-Satisf12345) for Vioxx  0.2870  ***     
 [ 4.4635]       
(6-Satisf12345) for Bextra  1.6105 ***  
 [ 10.519]       
Inverse of Advertising  -0.2749    -2.0548  *** 
 [ -1.0472] [-5.6204] 
Cox2 * Age  0.0333  ***  0.0337  *** 
 [ 30.273]    [30.6364]   
Cox2 * Sex  -0.0967 *** -0.1086  ***
 [ -2.8441]    [-3.157]  
Cox2 * low income  -0.1319  ***  -0.1225  *** 
 [ -3.961][ -3.5714] 
Cox2 * low education  -0.0089    -0.0136   
 [ -0.2618]  [-0.3988]  
Cox2 * HEALTHINS  0.0606 0.0698 
 [ 0.8301]  [0.9790]  
Cox2 * INSPLAN  0.6539  *** 0.6653 *** 
 [ 11.911][ 11.9443] 
Cox2 * DRUGINS  -0.1759  *** -0.1729 *** 
 [ -5.0986]  [-4.9119]  
Medline article (neg)  -0.2032 -0.1867 
 [ -1.623]   [-1.6179]  
Medline article (non-neg)  0.1910    0.1457   
 [ 0.8534][ 0.6912] 
Lexis article (neg)  0.0626  *** 0.0606 *** 
 [ 3.3122]  [3.1563]  
Lexis article (non-neg)  0.0903 *** 0.0889  ***
 [ 4.8548]  [4.7287]  
After FDA update  0.0969  *  0.1091  * 
 [ 1.7211][ 1.8746] 
Log likelihood -17226 -17315 
# of patients  6577    6577   
# of prescriptions 17329 17329 
Notes: Throughout Tables 5 to 9, the default drug is traditional NSAIDS. T-statistics in brackets. 
Satisfaction is measured by 6-satisf12345, computed as the average of all patient satisfaction up to the 
month before prescription. Advertising variable is measured as the inverse of cumulative sum of advertising 
expenditures up to the previous month. Articles are measured as the log of cumulative sum of weighted 
articles up to the previous day. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 40Table 6: Models with different learning structure 
   (1) (2) (3) 
Basic model Basic model with 
across- learning only 
Basic model 
with within- learning only 
 α 0  -16.7348 *** -78.2229 -5.6142  **
   [-4.4589]   [-0.4911]   [-2.1568]   
 α R  2.5693 *** 103.279 2.3425  ***
   [7.6483]   [0.4823]   [8.1898]   
   σ v  0.4960   0.4960    0.4960 
γ (absolute risk aversion)  Set at 0 Set at 0 Set at 0 
Q0_celebrex 2.6971  ***  -0.1770   -0.2610   
   [2.8217]    [-1.0656]    [-0.2746]   
Q0_vioxx 2.3237 ** -0.0496 -0.3616 
 [ 2.3099]    [-0.2453]    [-0.3718]   
Q0_bextra 2.3090  **  -1.3623  * -0.8229   
   [2.2647] [-5.9807] [-0.8335] 
σ q0  0.3066  ***      0.2927  *** 
 [ 7.4460]        [8.1967]   
σ Q0 celebrex  0.0177  *** 0.0006   
   [7.0597]    [0.4727]       
σ Q0 vioxx  0.0199  ***  0.0004       
   [7.1608] [0.4748]  
σ Q0  bextra  0.0294  ***  0.0009      
   [6.7797]    [0.4759]      
Inverse of Advertising -0.5673 *** -0.6465 * -0.9521  ***
   [-2.7105]    [-2.3424]    [-4.3958]  
Cox2 * Age  0.0177  ***  0.0337  * 0.0174  *** 
   [13.3565] [28.6727] [12.0504] 
Cox2 * Sex  -0.1219  ***  -0.1052  * -0.1291  *** 
   [-2.9104]    [-3.001]    [-3.1486]  
Cox2 * low income  -0.2007 *** -0.1208 * -0.2033  ***
   [-4.8697]   [-3.5537]   [-5.0342]  
*  Cox2 * low education  -0.0684    -0.0174    -0.0739 
   [-1.6274][ -0.5031][ -1.7888] 
Cox2 * HEALTHINS  -0.0015    0.0741    -0.0069   
   [-0.0174]   [1.0262]   [-0.0821]  
Cox2 * INSPLAN  0.4330 *** 0.674 * 0.4171  ***
 [ 6.5639]  [12.2724]  [6.3665]  
Cox2 * DRUGINS  -0.2277  *** -0.1833 * -0.1923  *** 
 [ -5.3704][ -5.246][ -4.6508] 
Medline article (neg)  -0.7520  *** -0.0555   -0.4343 *** 
 [ -4.4846]   [-0.5389]   [-2.8955]  
Medline article (non-neg)  -0.9671 *** -0.4621 * -0.2654 
 [ -3.511]  [-7.4174]   [-0.9925]  
Lexis article (neg)  0.0911  *** 0.0797 * 0.1099  *** 
 [ 3.7882][ 4.1067][ 4.6372] 
Lexis article (non-neg)  0.0173    0.0897  * 0.0086  
 [ 0.7274]   [4.7318]   [0.362]  
After FDA update  -0.0803 -0.0689 0.0161 
 [ -1.0502]   [-1.1513]   [0.2325]  
Log likelihood -11376 -17259 -11565 
# of patients  6577 6577 6577 




Table 7: Learning models with and without medical and news articles 
   (1) (2) (3)
Basic model Basic  model  with 
Medline only 
Basic model 
with Lexis only 
 α 0  -16.7348  *** -17.7292 ***  -2.2200  ***
   [-4.4589][ -6.0502] [-2.7177] 
 α R  2.5693  *** 2.6205 ***  2.5611  ***
   [7.6483]   [8.7214]    [8.0841] 
 σ v  0.4960 0.4960 0.4960 
γ (absolute risk aversion)  Set at 0    Set at 0    Set at 0   
Q0_celebrex 2.6971  ***  2.8960  ***  -2.3770   *** 
   [2.8217] [2.8864] [-21.0303] 
Q0_vioxx 2.3237  **  2.5121  **  -2.3183  *** 
 [ 2.3099]    [2.3804]    [-20.3324] 
Q0_bextra 2.3090 ** 2.4614 ** -2.5121  *** 
   [2.2647]    [2.2928]    [-20.5037] 
σ q0  0.3066  ***  0.2979  ***  0.2963  ***
 [ 7.4460] [8.4998] [8.1301] 
σ Q0 celebrex  0.0177  ***  0.0175  ***  0.0122  ***
   [7.0597]    [7.7912]    [7.4432] 
σ Q0 vioxx  0.0199  *** 0.0195  *** 0.0120  ***
   [7.1608]    [8.1070]    [7.4906] 
σ Q0  bextra  0.0294  ***  0.0276  ***  0.0003 
   [6.7797] [7.5103][ 1.5751] 
Inverse of Advertising  -0.5673  ***  -0.5594  ** -1.1450 ***
   [-2.7105]    [-2.5702]   [-4.552] 
Cox2 * Age  0.0177 *** 0.0176 *** 0.0181  ***
   [13.3565]    [13.1596]   [13.9286] 
Cox2 * Sex  -0.1219  ***  -0.1219  *** -0.1234  ***
   [-2.9104] [-2.9018][ -3.0968] 
Cox2 * low income  -0.2007  *** -0.1995 *** -0.1974  ***
   [-4.8697]   [-4.8751]   [-4.8776] 
Cox2 * low education  -0.0684 -0.0641 -0.0682  *
   [-1.6274]   [-1.5144]   [-1.6595] 
Cox2 * HEALTHINS  -0.0015    -0.0032    0.0285 
   [-0.0174][ -0.0377][ 0.3349] 
Cox2 * INSPLAN  0.4330  *** 0.4323 *** 0.4291  ***
 [ 6.5639]   [6.6111]   [6.6021] 
Cox2 * DRUGINS  -0.2277 *** -0.2252 *** -0.2643  ***
 [ -5.3704]   [-5.2828]   [-6.5615] 
Medline article (neg)  -0.7520  *** -0.6739 ***  
 [ -4.4846][ -3.9215] 
Medline article (non-neg)  -0.9671  *** -1.0345 ***  
 [ -3.511]   [-3.6034]    
Lexis article (neg)  0.0911 *** 0.0601  **
 [ 3.7882]      [2.5662] 
Lexis article (non-neg)  0.0173        -0.0112 
 [ 0.7274][ -0.4759] 
After FDA update  -0.0803    -0.068    -0.6988  ***
 [ -1.0502]   [-0.8983]  [-14.9698] 
Log  likelihood  -11376   -11387   -11539 
# of patients  6577 6577 6577 
# of prescriptions  17329 17329 17329 
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Table 8: Learning models with unobserved heterogeneity
   (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Basic model Basic model 
plus 2-type 
random effects 
Basic model  
plus 3-type random 
effects 
Basic model plus 
normal random 
effects 
 α 0  -16.7348  ***  -16.7665  **  -15.062  ***  -10.075  *** 
   [-4.4589] [-2.3868] [-3.5513]    [-2.9900] 
 α R  2.5693 *** 2.8871 *** 1.9062  ***  1.7146  ***
   [7.6483]   [4.3816]    [7.3826]    [7.2924]   
σ v  0.4960 0.4960 0.4960    0.4960
γ (absolute risk aversion)  Set at 0 Set at 0 Set at 0    Set at 0
Q0_celebrex  2.6971  ***  1.5902    4.1650  **  3.5070  ** 
   [2.8217] [1.0334] [2.4419]    [2.1934]
Q0_vioxx 2.3237 ** 1.2475 3.7237  **  3.1889  *
 [ 2.3099]    [0.7738]    [2.0994]    [1.8939]  
Q0_bextra 2.309 ** 1.2234 3.8992  **  3.1233  *
   [2.2647] [0.7508] [2.1668]    [1.8424]
σ q0  0.3066  ***  0.2748  ***  0.3913  ***  0.6977  *** 
 [ 7.4460] [4.2553] [7.0522]    [5.4915]
σ Q0 celebrex 0.0177 *** 0.0214 *** 0.0330  ***  0.0557  ***
   [7.0597]    [4.1597]    [6.8166]    [5.3064]  
σ Q0 vioxx 0.0199 *** 0.0243 *** 0.0372  ***  0.0620 ***
   [7.1608] [4.1382] [6.8097]    [5.3305]
σ Q0  bextra 0.0294  ***  0.0331  ***  0.0491  ***  0.0921 *** 
   [6.7797] [4.0741] [6.4683]    [5.0416]
Inverse of Advertising -0.5673 *** -0.5303 ** -0.5321  **  -0.7083 ***
   [-2.7105]    [-2.3151]    [-2.3092]    [-2.6497]  
Cox2 * Age  0.0177 *** 0.0492 *** 0.0591  ***  0.0409 ***
   [13.3565] [19.2723] [17.8998]    [17.7789]
Cox2 * Sex  -0.1219  ***  -0.2491  ***  -0.3748  ***  -0.2620 *** 
   [-2.9104] [-3.5346] [-4.2314]    [-4.2175]
Cox2 * low income  -0.2007 *** -0.2969 *** -0.4637  ***  -0.2380 ***
   [-4.8697]   [-3.4475]  [-3.9185]    [-3.4795]  
Cox2 * low education  -0.0684 -0.1103 -0.1254    -0.0220
   [-1.6274][ -1.2236][ -1.1796]    [-0.3115]
Cox2 * HEALTHINS  -0.0015    0.1170    0.1276    0.0999   
   [-0.0174][ 0.6776][ 0.7203]  [0.7562]
Cox2 * INSPLAN  0.4330 *** 0.6913 *** 0.8165  *** 0.6453 ***
 [ 6.5639]   [6.1174]  [6.2004]  [6.5212]  
Cox2 * DRUGINS  -0.2277 *** -0.4658 *** -0.2257  ** -0.1558 **
 [ -5.3704][ -5.4517][ -2.1169]  [-2.2431]
Medline article (neg)  -0.7520  *** -0.9028 *** -1.1146  *** -0.8561  *** 
 [ -4.4846][ -3.7983][ -4.4816]  [-3.2479]
Medline article (non-neg)  -0.9671 *** -1.2490 *** -1.4297  *** -1.4646 ***
 [ -3.511]   [-2.8952]  [-3.0832]  [-3.2011]  
Lexis article (neg)  0.0911 *** 0.0590 0.0278  0.1308 ***
 [ 3.7882][ 1.5536][ 0.6364]  [3.1384]
Lexis article (non-neg)  0.0173    0.0177    -0.0519    -0.0011   
 [ 0.7274][ 0.5646][ -1.5106]  [-0.0267]
After FDA update  -0.0803 -0.0607 -0.0666  -0.1233
 [ -1.0502]   [-0.6458]  [-0.6900]  [-1.1698]  
To be continued on the next page 
     
     
 43Table 8 (Continued)     
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Basic model Basic model 
plus 2-type 
random effects 
Basic model  
plus 3-type random 
effects 
Basic model plus 
normal random 
effects 
θ_celebrex of type 2   4.1771 *** -2.7667  *** 
     [ 44.343]  [-13.048]      
θ_vioxx of type 2     3.9791  *** -2.8848  ***    
   [ 42.811][ -14.102]  
θ_bextra of type 2     4.3559  *** -2.0819  ***    
     [ 31.646]  [-6.5969]      
Probability of type 1   0.5846 *** 0.2731  *** 
     [ 48.141]  [12.079]      
θ_celebrex of type 3         3.3490  ***    
   [ 24.0066]  
θ_vioxx of type 3         3.0855  ***    
         [ 21.7766]      
θ_bextra of type 3   3.3047  *** 
         [ 18.506]      
Probability of type 2         0.4025  ***    
   [ 18.9100]  
σ ind-celebrex RE           2.4923  ***
           [ 25.0627] 
σ ind-vioxx RE     2.3108 ***
           [ 25.7732] 
σ ind-bextra RE           2.0277  ***
     [ 17.7305]
Log likelihood  -11376 -10181 -10086  -10577
#  of  patients  6577   6577  6577    6577 
# of prescriptions 
BIC 
17329
22967    17329
20616    17329 
20465    17329
21398 
 44Table 9: Robustness check on sampling weights 
   (1) (2) (3) 
Basic model Basic model plus  Basic model  
α 0  -16.7348 *** -16.8017 *** -19.2098  *** 
   [-4.4589] [-7.4687] [-3.9187]   
***  α R  2.5693 *** 2.5797 *** 2.6403 
   [7.6483] [11.9663] [6.1506]   
   σ v  0.4960 0.4960 0.4960 
  γ (absolute risk aversion)  Set at 0 Set at 0 Set at 0 
*** Q0_celebrex 2.6971 *** 2.7038 *** 3.3535 
   [2.8217] [4.7383] [2.9303]   
*** Q0_vioxx 2.3237 ** 2.3324 *** 3.2387 
 [2.3099] [3.9314] [2.7111]   
*** Q0_bextra 2.309 ** 2.3078 *** 2.4873 
   [2.2647] [3.7378] [1.1891]   
*** σ q0  0.3066  *** 0.3063 *** 0.2910 
 [7.4460] [13.1666] [6.0368]   
*** σ Q0 celebrex  0.0177  *** 0.0066 *** 0.0170 
   [7.0597] [9.8280] [5.8207]   
*** σ Q0 vioxx  0.0199  *** 0.0075 *** 0.0185 
   [7.1608] [10.0908] [5.8224]   
*** σ Q0  bextra  0.0294  *** 0.0111 *** 0.0265 
   [6.7797] [9.5648] [5.4660]   
  Inverse of Advertising -0.5673 *** -0.5655 ***  
   [-2.7105] [-2.8889]    
**  Log total detailing    0.2486 
   [2.1864]   
*** Log total DTCA    -0.1704 
   [-4.6389]   
*** Cox2 * Age  0.0177 *** 0.0177 *** 0.0177 
   [13.3565] [13.2926] [13.2303]   
*** Cox2 * Sex  -0.1219 *** -0.1217 *** -0.1191 
   [-2.9104] [-2.8713] [-2.8355]   
*** Cox2 * low income  -0.2007 *** -0.2007 *** -0.2042 
   [-4.8697] [-4.8256] [-4.9374]   
  Cox2 * low education  -0.0684 -0.0677 -0.0667 
   [-1.6274] [-1.5916] [-1.5834]   
  Cox2 * HEALTHINS  -0.0015 -0.0011 0.0062 
   [-0.0174] [-0.013] [0.0717]   
*** Cox2 * INSPLAN  0.433 *** 0.4331 *** 0.4294 
 [6.5639] [6.5698] [6.4765]   
*** Cox2 * DRUGINS  -0.2277 *** -0.2276 *** -0.2293 
 [-5.3704] [-5.272] [-5.3778]   
*** Medline article (neg)  -0.752 *** -0.7481 *** -0.5583 
 [-4.4846] [-6.0478] [-2.9170]   
*** Medline article   -0.9671 *** -0.9683 *** -1.3000 
 [-3.511] [-5.9626] [-4.0813]   
*** Lexis article (neg)  0.0911 *** 0.0903 *** 0.1079 
 [3.7882] [3.7466] [4.4297]   
  Lexis article (non-neg)  0.0173 0.0178 0.0277 
 [0.7274] [0.7513] [1.1587]   
*  After FDA update  -0.0803 -0.0811 -0.1296 
 [-1.0502] [-1.0566] [-1.6721]   
Log likelihood -11376 -11375 -11367   
  # of patients  6577 6577 6577 
# of prescriptions  17329 17329 17329   
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Table 10: Model fit: % of correct prediction of the actual RX choice  




































Vioxx Bextra All  others 
 
#1: No FDA 
update 
 
1.07% 0.78% 1.58%  -0.63% 
 
#2: Nationwide 
sharing of patient 
feedbacks 
 





-30.44% -25.36% -27.11%  17.03% 
 
 